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Abstract	
This	 article	 offers	 a	 reconceptualization	 of	 the	 impact	 of	 the	 Inter-American	
Human	Rights	System	(IAHRS,	or	the	System).	To	understand	the	impact	of	the	
IAHRS,	 and	 the	 continuing	 demand	 for	 it	 from	 across	 the	 region	 of	 Latin	
America,	 in	 particular,	 we	 need	 to	 look	 beyond	 rule	 compliance	 models	 of	
international	human	rights	 law.	This	article	examines	how,	 in	what	ways,	and	
under	 what	 conditions	 the	 IAHRS	 impacts	 on	 domestic	 human	 rights.	 In	 a	
nutshell,	 the	 IAHRS	 is	 activated	 by	 domestic	 stakeholders	 in	 ways	 that	
transcend	traditional	compliance	perspectives,	and	that	have	the	potential	 to	
provoke	positive	domestic	human	rights	change.	
Keywords:	Inter-American	Human	Rights	System;	Latin	America;	human	rights	
impact;	compliance;	international	human	rights	law.	
	
Resumo	
Esse	 artigo	 oferece	 uma	 reconceitualização	 sobre	 o	 impacto	 do	 Sistema	
Interamericano	de	Direitos	Humanos	(SIDH,	Sistema).	Para	entender	o	impacto	
do	 SIDH	 e	 a	 continuada	 demanda	 de	 toda	 a	 região	 da	 América	 Latina	 ao	
Sistema,	é	necessário	olhar	para	além	dos	modelos	que	 focam	a	observância	
do	 Direito	 Internacional	 dos	 Direitos	 Humanos.	 Esse	 artigo	 analisa	 como,	 de	
que	 maneiras	 e	 em	 que	 condições	 o	 SIDH	 impacta	 os	 direitos	 humanos	 no	
plano	 doméstico.	 Em	 síntese,	 o	 SIDH	 é	 ativado	 por	 atores	 domésticos	 de	
maneiras	 que	 transcendem	as	 perspectivas	 tradicionais	 de	 observância	 legal,	
com	potencial	 para	produzirem	mudanças	positivas	nos	direitos	humanos	no	
plano	doméstico.	
Palavras-chave:	Sistema	Interamericano	de	Direitos	Humanos;	América	Latina;	
impacto	dos	direitos	humanos;	observância;	direito	 internacional	dos	direitos	
humanos.		
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This	 article	 offers	 a	 reconceptualization	 of	 the	 impact	 of	 the	 Inter-American	
Human	Rights	System	(IAHRS,	or	 the	System).	The	main	theme	that	animates	
this	 article	 is	 that	 in	 order	 to	 understand	 the	 impact	 of	 the	 IAHRS,	 and	 the	
continuing	demand	for	it	from	across	the	region	of	Latin	America,	in	particular,	
we	need	to	look	beyond	rule	compliance	models	of	international	human	rights	
law.	 It	 is	 often	 commented	 that	 the	 IAHRS	 suffers	 from	 a	 compliance	 crisis.	
Governments	 in	 the	 region,	 on	 this	 view,	 generally	 refuse	 to	 abide	 by,	 or	
simply	ignore,	the	rulings	and	orders	issued	by	the	Inter-American	Commission	
and	 the	 Inter-American	 Court.	 Indeed,	 the	 IAHRS	 suffers	 from	 generally	 low	
levels	 of	 compliance.	 This,	 it	 is	 argued,	 demonstrates	 the	 limited,	 or	 indeed,	
non-existent	 impact	of	the	 Inter-American	System	in	ways	that	undermine	 its	
legitimacy	and	authority.	And	yet,	 the	demand	 for	 the	 regional	human	 rights	
system	 has	 never	 been	 higher	 as	 its	 caseload	 continues	 to	 increase	 year	 by	
year.	Constant	and	increasing	demand	for	the	IAHRS	indicates	that	the	System	
matters,	 particularly	 to	 those	 whose	 rights	 have	 been	 violated.	 This	 article	
examines	how,	in	what	ways,	and	under	what	conditions	the	IAHRS	impacts	on	
domestic	 human	 rights.	 In	 a	 nutshell,	 the	 IAHRS	 is	 activated	 by	 domestic	
stakeholders	 in	ways	 that	 transcend	 traditional	 compliance	perspectives,	 and	
that	have	the	potential	to	provoke	positive	domestic	human	rights	change.	
There	are	 three	main	parts	 to	 this	article.	The	 first	part	discusses	 the	
need	 to	 go	 beyond	 conventional	 compliance	 perspectives	 on	 international	
human	 rights.	 The	 second	 part	 highlights	 three	 key	 dimensions	 of	 how	 the	
IAHRS	works	 in	 practice	 by	 focusing	 on	 the	 role	 of	 domestic	 stakeholders	 in	
provoking	 human	 rights	 change.	 The	 final	 part	 offers	 reflections	 on	 the	
challenges	 facing	 the	 IAHRS	 and	 what	 a	 scholarly	 research	 agenda	 on	 the	
system	 might	 look	 like	 in	 order	 to	 contribute	 towards	 the	 genuine	
strengthening	of	the	System.	
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I.	The	Inter-American	Human	Rights	System:	from	compliance	to	impact	
	
The	Inter-American	Human	Rights	System	(IAHRS)	has	emerged	as	an	 integral	
part	of	the	regional	institutional	landscape	of	the	Americas	since	the	mid-20th	
century.	The	system	was	created	and	experienced	its	 initial	development	 in	a	
region	 marked	 by	 the	 Cold	 War	 and	 long	 periods	 of	 repressive	 and	
authoritarian	 rule,	 from	 the	 1950s	 to	 the	mid-1980s.	 During	 this	 period,	 the	
IAHRS	primarily	sought	to	identify	general	patterns	of	human	rights	violations	
rather	 than	 focusing	 on	 individual	 cases.	 The	 Inter-American	 Commission’s	
country	 visits	 and	 reports	 played	 an	 important	 role	 in	 some	 cases	 –	 for	
example	in	Nicaragua	under	Somoza	(1978),	and	in	Argentina	in	1979	–	but	had	
limited	 influence	 overall.	 With	 the	 general	 return	 to	 democracy	 in	 Latin	
America,	the	Inter-American	System	gained	in	influence.	In	particular,	with	the	
democratic	transitions,	the	System	shaped	political	struggles	over	transitional	
justice,	 and	 the	 political	 calculations	made	 by	 transitional	 governments	with	
regards	 to	 how	 to	 deal	 with	 human	 rights	 abuses	 under	 previous	
(predominantly	 military)	 regimes.	 From	 the	 mid-1990s	 onwards,	 the	 IAHRS	
turned	 its	 attention	 to	 the	 challenge	 of	 improving	 the	 quality	 of	 democratic	
rule,	 and	 efforts	 to	 address	 human	 rights	 challenges	 in	 a	 regional	 context	
where	 electoral	 democracy	 has	 made	 significant	 advances,	 but	 also	 where	
there	continue	to	be	widespread	human	rights	abuses.	
Since	its	creation,	the	institutional	development	of	the	IAHRS	has	been	
significant.	The	 IAHRS	has	established	the	 legal	obligation	under	 regional	and	
international	human	rights	law	of	states	to	protect	the	rights	of	citizens,	and	in	
the	 light	 of	 the	 failure	 to	 do	 so,	 the	 international	 obligation	 to	 hold	 states	
accountable.	 In	 the	 process,	 the	 IAHRS	 has	 evolved	 from	 its	 origins	 as	 a	
‘classical’	 intergovernmental	 regime.	 An	 independent	 regional	 human	 rights	
court	and	an	autonomous	commission	are	regularly	 judging	whether	regional	
states	are	in	compliance	with	their	international	human	rights	obligations.	The	
access	 of	 individuals	 and	 regional	 human	 rights	 organizations	 to	 the	 human	
rights	 regime	 has	 strengthened	 over	 time	 as	 the	 system	 has	 become	
increasingly	 judicialized	 with	 a	 procedural	 focus	 on	 legal	 argumentation	 and	
the	generation	of	regional	human	rights	jurisprudence.	
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These	 institutional	 developments	 notwithstanding,	 it	 is	 regularly	
pointed	 out	 that	 the	 IAHRS	 has	 a	 patchy	 compliance	 record.	 General	
compliance	 rates	 with	 both	 the	 Commission	 and	 the	 Court	 are	 indeed	 low.	
Partial	 compliance	 with	 the	 System’s	 rulings	 and	 recommendations	 are	 a	
common	 outcome,	 meaning	 that	 states	 comply	 with	 some	 of	 the	 IAHRS’	
requirements	but	not	all	of	them.2	These	findings	are	regularly	seized	upon	to	
highlight	 a	 ‘compliance	 crisis’	within	 the	 IAHRS,	 in	which	governments	 in	 the	
region	 frequently	 refuse	to	abide	by,	or	simply	 ignore,	 the	rulings	and	orders	
issued	by	 the	 Inter-American	Commission	 and	 the	 Inter-American	Court.	 The	
patchy	 compliance	 record	 demonstrates,	 on	 this	 view,	 the	 limited	 impact	 of	
the	 Inter-American	 System	 in	 ways	 that	 undermine	 its	 legitimacy	 and	
authority.	
Nonetheless,	 the	demand	 for	 the	System	has	never	been	higher.	 The	
number	of	complaints	submitted	to	the	IAHRS	against	states	by	individuals	and	
organisations	across	the	region	have	been	continually	rising	over	the	last	two	
decades.	 This	 indicates	 that	 the	 System	matters,	 particularly	 to	 those	whose	
rights	have	been	violated,	and	are	vulnerable	to	violations.	It	also	suggests	that	
there	are	significant	 ‘extra-compliance’	effects	of	 the	 IAHRS	 that	merit	 closer	
scrutiny.	 Recent	 research,	 moreover,	 on	 little-studied	 cases	 of	 friendly	
settlements,	precautionary	measures,	as	well	as	strategic	 litigation	by	human	
rights	organisations,	has	consistently	confirmed	the	existence	of	such	effects,	
which	 reach	 beyond	 the	 degree	 of	 state	 compliance	 in	 individual	 cases	
(Engstrom	forthcoming).	And	yet,	how	could	this	apparent	mismatch	between	
what	might	be	crudely	understood	as	the	System’s	supply	of	justice	in	concrete	
cases,	on	 the	one	hand,	and	demand	 for	 justice,	on	 the	other,	be	explained?	
Put	differently,	how,	in	what	ways,	under	what	conditions,	and	to	whom	does	
the	System	matter?	
	
	
																																																								
2	 It	 should	 be	 recognised,	 however,	 that	 a	 major	 challenge	 in	 assessing	 compliance	
with	IAHRS	decisions	is	the	absence	of	adequate	data,	especially	 longitudinal	data,	to	
allow	 for	 the	development	of	 reliable	 indicators	and	measurements	of	 the	effects	of	
the	System.	I	will	return	to	this	point	later	in	the	article.	
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The	 Problem	 of	 (Rule)	 Compliance:	 towards	 an	 understanding	 of	 the	
domestic	effects	of	the	IAHRS	
	
The	 IAHRS	offers	 a	 unique	opportunity	 to	 examine	how	 international	 human	
rights	may	matter	 in	ways	 that	 are	not	 captured	 in	 rates	of	 compliance	with	
formal	 legal	 rules	 and	 judicial	 rulings.	 The	 limitations	 of	 compliance	
perspectives	 on	 international	 (human	 rights)	 law	 have	 been	 noted	 in	 the	
literature	 (Howse	 and	 Teitel	 2010).	 It	 widely	 recognised	 that	 compliance	 is	
characterised	by	prolonged	and	often	highly	contested	processes.	For	example,	
Hafner-Burton	 highlights	 that	 “compliance	 is	 not	 an	 all-or-nothing	 affair	 and	
that	 the	 effects	 of	 human	 rights	 regimes,	 when	 and	 where	 they	 exist,	 are	
conditional	on	other	institutions	and	actors”	(Hafner-Burton	2012:	275).	There	
is	also	an	 important	distinction	between	‘compliance’	and	‘effectiveness’	that	
is	 often	 glossed	 over	 in	 human	 rights	 and	 international	 law	 scholarship.	
Compliance	 usually	 refers	 to	 the	 implementation	 of	 the	 decisions	 –	 rulings,	
recommendations	 -	 handed	 down	 by	 international	 human	 rights	 institutions,	
such	as	the	IACtHR	or	IACHR.	Raustiala	and	Slaughter	argue	that	“most	theories	
of	 compliance	 with	 international	 law	 are	 at	 bottom	 theories	 of	 behavioural	
influence	of	legal	rules”	and	they	define	compliance	as	“a	state	of	conformity	or	
identity	 between	 an	 actor’s	 behavior	 and	 a	 specified	 rule”	 (Raustiala	 and	
Slaughter	2002:539).	 Effectiveness,	 in	 contrast,	 generally	 refers	 to	 the	degree	
to	which	the	international	human	rights	institutions	work	improves	the	level	of	
human	 rights	 conditions	 and	 decreases	 the	 likelihood	 of	 the	 repetition	 of	
abuses,	while	also	providing	satisfactory	recourse	to	the	victims.	
On	this	account,	compliance	might	be	necessary	for	effectiveness,	but	
it	is	not	sufficient.	For	example,	international	rules	as	embedded	in	human	rights	
institutions	 can	 be	 effective	 even	 if	 compliance	 is	 low	 as	 “high	 levels	 of	
compliance	 can	 indicate	 low,	 readily	 met	 and	 ineffective	 standards”	 and	
institutions	with	“significant	non-compliance	can	still	be	effective	 if	 they	 induce	
changes	 in	 behavior”	 (Raustiala	 and	 Slaughter	 2002:539).	 For	 Levy	 et	 al.,	
referring	 generally	 to	 international	 institutions,	 or	 regimes,	 “[e]ffective	
regimes	cause	changes	in	the	behaviour	of	actors	and	in	patterns	of	interaction	
among	 them	 in	 ways	 that	 contribute	 to	 the	 management	 of	 targeted	
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problems”	 (Levy	 et	 al.	 1995:292).	 From	 this	 perspective,	 assessments	 of	
institutional	 effectiveness	 focus	 on	 the	 capacity	 of	 institutions	 to	 generate	
specific	 policies	 and	 the	 extent	 to	which	 these	 are	 implemented	 through	 the	
passage	of	legislation,	the	creation	or	reform	of	domestic	institutions	that	prove	
effective	 in	attaining	 institutional	objectives.	On	 this	account,	 the	emphasis	 lies	
on	 observable	 behaviour	 and	 effectiveness	 is	 evaluated	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 the	
degree	 to	 which	 an	 institution	 ameliorates	 the	 problem	 that	 prompted	 its	
creation	in	the	first	place.	Compliance,	in	short,	is	distinct	from	(although	related	
to)	 effectiveness.	 Assessing	 compliance	 may	 shed	 some	 light	 on	 the	
effectiveness	of	 international	human	 rights	 institutions.	But	 it	 cannot	 tell	 the	
full	 story,	 and	 quite	 possibly,	 an	 exclusive	 focus	 on	 compliance	 risks	 being	
misleading.	
Most	 research	 to	 date	 on	 the	 IAHRS	 has	 adopted	 rule	 compliance	
perspectives	to	assess	its	impact.	This	body	of	research	has	tended	to	focus	on	
the	Inter-American	Court.	Compliance	has	been	measured	by	assessing	states’	
implementation	of	the	discrete	obligations	within	each	Court	ruling.	The	Inter-
American	Court’s	jurisprudence	is	arguably	well-suited	for	this	type	of	analysis,	
as	the	Court	outlines	specific	orders	within	each	case	and	then	the	Court	tracks	
states’	 implementation	of	those	orders.	For	example,	if	the	Court	asks	a	state	
to	 pay	 reparations,	 hold	 a	 perpetrator	 accountable	 and	 pass	 a	 new	 law,	
conceptually,	 though	 not	 always	 practically,	 it	 is	 relatively	 straightforward	 to	
determine	 if	 the	 state	 has	 complied	 with	 each	 of	 these	 specific	 orders.	
Disaggregating	 compliance	 into	 the	 smallest	 unit	 of	 analysis	 can	 provide	 a	
nuanced	 image	 of	 compliance.	 Hillebrecht,	 for	 example,	 has	 assessed	
compliance	on	this	basis	and	she	has	captured	states’	practice	of	picking	and	
choosing	 discrete	measures	within	 each	 ruling,	 in	what	 she	 refers	 to	 as	 à	 la	
carte	compliance	(Hillebrecht	2014).	
These	insights	notwithstanding,	there	are	three	main	set	of	reasons	for	
shifting	 the	 analytical	 focus	 beyond	 rule	 compliance	 to	 generate	 a	 better	
understanding	 of	 the	 impact	 of	 the	 IAHRS.	 The	 first	 concerns	 the	 normative	
and	institutional	development	of	the	IAHRS	that	highlights	the	System’s	role	in	
advancing,	 interpreting,	 and	 enforcing	 human	 rights	 standards.	 In	 terms	 of	
rule-making	 both	 the	 Inter-American	 Commission	 and	 the	 Court	 perform	 a	
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crucial	function	in	the	development	of	human	rights	standards.	The	System	has	
developed	 regional	 standards	 incorporating	 a	 wide	 range	 of	 human	 rights	
norms.3	 In	 its	practice,	 the	 IAHRS	has	progressively	addressed	an	 increasingly	
expansive	 set	 of	 human	 rights	 issues.	 The	 Court	 has	 developed	 progressive	
human	rights	jurisprudence	through	its	rulings.	The	Commission	also	serves	an	
important	function	in	this	regard	through	its	thematic	reports,	development	of	
policy	guidelines	(ranging	from,	e.g.	freedom	of	expression,	rights	of	detainees,	
to	LGBT	rights);	in	other	words,	though	its	role	in	the	development	of	soft	law.	
The	 IAHRS	 is	 increasingly	 ambitious	not	only	 in	 terms	of	 the	 types	of	human	
rights	 challenges	 it	 deals	 with,	 but	 also	 in	 terms	 of	 what	 it	 demands	 from	
states.	In	particular,	the	Inter-American	Court’s	evolving	policies	of	reparations	
now	span	from	monetary	compensation	to	victims,	symbolic	reparations	(e.g.	
memorials),	 to	 demands	 for	 state	 reforms	 and	 criminal	 prosecutions	 of	
individual	 perpetrators.	 As	 a	 result,	 the	 IAHRS	 has	 emerged	 as	 the	 central	
human	rights	reference	point	in	its	region.	
The	IAHRS	has	also	developed	important	accountability	functions.	The	
IAHRS	monitors	 and	 evaluates	 states’	 human	 rights	 records.	 An	 independent	
regional	human	rights	court	and	an	autonomous	commission	regularly	monitor	
the	 performance	 of	 regional	 states	 and	 judge	whether	 regional	 states	 are	 in	
compliance	with	 their	 international	human	rights	obligations.	 In	addition,	 the	
IAHRS	 has	 established	 itself	 as	 an	 important	 advocacy	 actor	 in	 its	 own	 right.	
The	 Commission	 in	 particular,	 has	 developed	 a	 set	 of	 tools	 in	 addition	 to	
individual	cases	that	range	from	public	diplomacy	in	the	form	of	press	releases,	
public	hearings,	onsite	visits,	interim	measures	(precautionary	mechanisms),	to	
behind	 the	 scenes	negotiations	with	 state	officials	 and	 individual	 petitioners.	
When	exclusively	seen	from	a	top-down	perspective,	however,	these	are	weak																																																									
3	For	example,	an	indication	of	the	evolution	of	the	regional	human	rights	system	as	it	
has	extended	 its	 reach	across	a	 variety	of	human	 rights	 issue-areas	 could	be	 seen	 in	
the	 ratification	 rates	 of	 regional	 human	 rights	 instruments.	 Yet,	 there	 is	 significant	
regional	variation	with	regards	to	the	formal	adherence	to	the	system.	This	is	reflected	
in	the	uneven	adoption	of	regional	human	rights	instruments	by	OAS	member	states.	
Indeed,	 one	 of	 the	 contentious	 issues	 surrounding	 the	 IAHRS	 is	 precisely	 its	 uneven	
ratification	 record.	While	most	 Latin	 American	 states	 demonstrate	 a	 high	 degree	 of	
formal	 commitment	 to	 the	 IAHRS,	 the	US,	Canada,	 and	most	of	 the	English-speaking	
Caribbean	 have	 not	 ratified	 the	 American	 Convention	 and	 have	 not	 accepted	 the	
jurisdiction	of	the	Inter-American	Court.	
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accountability	mechanisms.	There	are	no	enforcement	mechanisms	in	place	to	
hold	 states	 responsible	 for	 implementation	 to	account.	 For	example,	 there	 is	
no	 clearly	 mandated	 political	 compliance	 mechanism,	 as	 assumed	 by	 the	
Committee	of	Ministers	in	the	European	human	rights	system.	Nonetheless,	as	
will	be	discussed	below,	accountability	can	operate	through	various	channels,	
including	primarily	 domestic	 accountability	mechanisms	 –	 e.g.	 in	 the	 form	of	
mobilisation	of	public	opinion	around	specific	cases,	raising	awareness	through	
media	strategies,	and	domestic	litigation	processes.	
The	 second	 dimension	 of	 the	 IAHRS’	 impact	 not	 captured	 by	 rule	
compliance	 models	 concerns	 its	 increasing	 insertion	 into	 domestic	 policy,	
legislative,	and	judicial	debates	across	the	region.	The	internalization	of	IAHRS	
mechanisms	and	norms	in	domestic	political	and	legal	systems	has	significantly	
altered	the	character	of	human	rights	implementation.	The	IAHRS	is	no	longer	
primarily	concerned	with	“naming	and	shaming”	repressive	military	regimes.	It	
seeks	 rather	 to	 engage	 democratic	 regimes	 through	 a	 (quasi)judicial	 process	
that	assumes	at	least	partially	responsive	state	institutions.	This	broader	point	
underlines	 the	 importance	 for	human	 rights	 scholarship	 to	move	beyond	 the	
unitary	 state	 to	 consider	 how	 various	 state	 institutions	 and	 officials	 interact	
with	 the	 IAHRS	 to	 shape	 human	 rights	 implementation.	 Processes	 of	 human	
rights	 implementation	 have	 traditionally	 been	 dominated	 by	 the	 political	
branches	 of	 government	 and	 largely	 controlled	 by	 the	 Executive	 and	 the	
Ministry	 of	 Foreign	Affairs	 in	 particular.	Although	 these	 state	 entities	 remain	
crucial,	 a	 broader	 range	 of	 state	 institutions	 and	 actors	 are	 now	 involved	 in	
processes	 of	 implementation.	 In	 the	 practice	 of	 the	 IAHRS,	 states	 in	 Latin	
America	 have	 gone	 from	 being	 abusers	 of	 human	 rights	 to	 being	 their	main	
guarantors.	 An	 analytical	 focus	 on	 the	 disaggregated	 state	 in	 the	 region	 is	
therefore	 required.	Yet,	human	 rights	 scholarship,	 generally,	 continues	 to	 lag	
behind	the	practice	that	it	seeks	to	analyse.	
Building	 on	 this	 last	 point,	 the	 third	 dimension	 of	 the	 IAHRS’	 impact	
concerns	 its	 role	 in	 providing	 opportunities	 for	 domestic	 and	 transnational	
human	rights	actors	to	bring	pressure	for	change	in	their	domestic	political	and	
legal	 systems.	 The	 IAHRS	 is	 increasingly	 used	 for	 the	 implementation	 of	
regional	 human	 rights	 norms.	 The	 System	 offers	 an	 important	 platform	 for	
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human	 rights	NGOs;	 some	of	which	 have	 been	 very	 adept	 at	 integrating	 the	
IAHRS	 into	 their	 advocacy	 strategies	 in	order	 to	bring	pressure	 for	 change	 in	
their	 domestic	 political	 and	 legal	 systems.	Moreover,	 domestic	 judiciaries	 in	
particular	have	come	to	play	more	prominent	roles	as	arenas	of	human	rights	
compliance,	 leading	 to	 increasingly	 judicialized	 processes	 of	 compliance.	
Further	 study	 is	 required	of	 the	domestic	 judicial	 actors	 and	 institutions	 that	
act	 and	 could	 potentially	 act	 as	 ‘compliance	 constituencies’	 and	 conduits	 of	
domestic	 implementation	 linking	 international	 human	 rights	 norms	 to	
domestic	political	 and	 legal	 institutions	and	actors.4	 Similarly,	 this	 signals	 the	
importance	of	not	only	contentious	litigation	of	individual	cases,	but	attempts	
to	 advance	 broader	 changes	 through	 friendly	 settlement	 procedures.	 This	
“change	of	paradigm”	 in	human	 rights	 activism	 reflects	 the	 increasing	use	of	
individual	 cases	 to	 promote	 broader	 government	 policy,	 institutional,	 and	
judicial	changes.	
The	 case	 of	 Latin	 America	 and	 the	 IAHRS	 has	 the	 potential	 to	 offer	
scholarship	and	advocacy	significant	insights	into	how	human	rights	matter.	In	
the	 region,	 sustained	 human	 rights	 activism	 has	 indeed	 strengthened	
processes	 of	 socialization	 in	many	 societies,	 but	 rule-consistent	 behaviour	 as	
predicted	by	earlier	human	rights	scholarship	has	not	materialised	(Risse	et	al	
1999).	 To	 understand	 such	 partial	 outcomes	 requires	 a	more	 contextualised	
grasp	of	Latin	American	societies	and	rights-violating	groups	and	perpetrators.	
Such	perspectives	would	allow	a	better	understanding	of	many	contemporary	
human	rights	violations	in	Latin	America,	and	elsewhere,	that	are	occurring	in	
the	context	of	weak	and	fragile	states	where	state	responsibility	for	violations	
is	 difficult	 to	 establish	 and	 often	 even	 absent.	 In	 this	 regional	 context,	 even	
where	 and	 when	 genuine	 political	 will	 may	 exist,	 implementation	 is	 often	
hamstrung	by	a	state	infrastructure	ill-equipped	to	fulfil	its	function	across	the																																																									
4	 Interestingly,	 a	 more	 strategic	 vision	 of	 the	 IAHRS	 appears	 to	 be	 increasingly	
recognised	within	 some	 state	bureaucracies	 across	 Latin	America.	 State	prosecutors’	
offices	 in	several	countries	 (e.g.	Argentina	and	Brazil)	have	created	dedicated	human	
rights	units	to	actively	petition	the	Inter-American	Commission.	For	many	state	officials	
engaged	 in	 these	 forms	 of	 international	 litigation	 this	 engagement	 between	 state	
institutions	and	the	IAHRS	highlights	that	human	rights	advocacy	is	not	about	being	for	
or	against	the	state.	Rather,	it	is	about	using	all	available	tools	to	defend	human	rights,	
particularly	when	state	authorities	fail	to	protect	them.	
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national	 territory	 (O’Donnell	 1993).	 This	 also	 draws	 attention	 to	 the	 political	
contestation	 of	 human	 rights.	 The	 domestic	 impact	 of	 international	 human	
rights	 norms	 is	 invariably	 mediated	 by	 their	 broader	 norm	 salience	 in	 local	
contexts	 (Goodale	and	Engle	Merry	2007).	This	 reminds	us	of	 the	risks	of	 the	
reification	of	 the	 ‘the	 lens	of	 rule-compliance’	 to	 the	detriment	of	 advancing	
knowledge	 on	 local	 understandings	 of	 international	 human	 rights.	 As	 Howse	
and	Teitel	argue:		
	
Interpretation	 is	 pervasively	 determinative	 of	 what	 happens	 to	
legal	 rules	when	they	are	out	 in	 the	world;	and	yet	 ‘compliance’	
studies	begin	with	the	notion	that	to	look	at	effects,	we	start	with	
an	assumed	stable	and	agreed	meaning	to	a	rule,	and	whether	it	
is	 complied	 with	 or	 obeyed,	 so	 understood	 (Howse	 and	 Teitel	
2010:135).	
	
	
	
II.	 The	 Impact	 of	 the	 Inter-American	 System:	 the	 central	 role	 of	 domestic	
stakeholders	
	
The	normative	and	 institutional	evolution	of	 the	 IAHRS,	as	highlighted	above,	
has	led	to	an	increased	interaction	between	the	system	and	domestic	political	
processes	 and	 national	 legal	 orders.	 This	 section	 assesses	 how	 the	 System	
affects	 actors	 and	 structures	 political	 relationships.	 Three	 particularly	
significant	 dimensions	 will	 be	 highlighted:	 first,	 the	 role	 of	 the	 IAHRS	 in	
stimulating	human	rights	mobilisation	in	the	region;	second,	how	the	regional	
human	 rights	 standards	 and	 the	 Inter-American	 Court’s	 jurisprudence	 are	
shaping	domestic	constitutional	debates,	 litigation	strategies,	 judicial	 thinking	
and	 practice;	 and	 third,	 the	 role	 of	 state	 institutions	 in	 the	 effective	
implementation	 of	 IAHRS	 rulings,	 recommendations	 and	 human	 rights	
standards.	
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Civil	Society	Mobilisation	
	
Organised	civil	 society	has	become	the	 lifeblood	of	 the	 IAHRS.	Although	non-
state	 actors	 remain	 excluded	 from	 the	 formal	 decision-making	 fora	 of	 the	
Inter-American	system,	they	have	gained	significant	informal	influence	through	
their	 agenda-setting	 activities	 and	 expertise.	 Individuals	 and	 groups	 in	 the	
Americas	 may	 submit	 complaints	 of	 human	 rights	 violations	 to	 the	 Inter-
American	 Commission,	 and	 the	 Commission	 may	 refer	 cases	 to	 the	 Inter-
American	Court	 if	 the	 country	 involved	has	 accepted	 the	Court’s	 jurisdiction.	
The	 IAHRS	 hence	 has	 provided	 the	 platform	 upon	 which	 the	 struggle	 over	
human	 rights	 between	 activists	 and	 states	 has	 played	 out.	 Conversely,	 the	
IAHRS	 has	 had	 a	 significant	 impact	 on	 human	 rights	 organisations	 (HROs)	 in	
multiple	ways.	The	availability	of	the	IAHRS	for	domestic	human	rights	groups	
has	 the	 potential	 to	 strengthen	 the	 domestic	 position	 of	 those	 groups	 that	
engage	with	 the	 system.	The	 system	has	opened	new	political	 opportunities,	
increased	 flows	 of	 resources	 for	 human	 rights	 advocacy,	 encouraged	 the	
formation	 and	 activities	 of	 human	 rights	 organisations,	 provided	 discursive	
tools	 for	 effective	 framing	 in	 politically	 and	 socially	 salient	 terms,	 and	
facilitated	 formation	of	 alliances,	 new	 identities,	 and	 statuses	 (Engstrom	and	
Low	forthcoming;	Tsutsui	et	al.	2012).	Human	rights	groups	can	use	the	IAHRS	
to	expose	systemic	human	rights	violations;	to	negotiate	with	state	institutions	
through	 the	 friendly	 settlement	procedures	provided	by	 the	 IACHR;	 to	 frame	
social	and	political	debates	on	the	basis	of	IAHRS	norms	and	jurisprudence;	to	
promote	 the	 interests	 of	 vulnerable	 groups;	 to	 boost	 human	 rights	 litigation	
before	domestic	courts;	and	to	strengthen	regional	human	rights	networks	and	
use	 of	 the	 IAHRS	 in	 strategic	 supranational	 litigation.	 In	 short,	 the	 IAHRS	
provides	opportunities	for	domestic	and	transnational	human	rights	activists	to	
bring	pressure	for	change	in	their	domestic	political	systems.	
It	is	important	to	note	that	the	capacity	of	actors	to	mobilize	the	law	is	
highly	 unequal,	 and	 there	 is	 significant	 variation	 among	 civil	 society	
organizations	 in	 their	 use	 of	 the	 system.	 The	 vast	 majority	 of	 petitions	 that	
actually	 gain	 traction	 in	 the	 System	 –	 i.e.	 proceed	 beyond	 initial	 submission	
phase	–	are	advocated	by	NGOs	(for	example,	see:	Ferreira	and	Lima	2017,	in	
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this	 special	 issue).	 The	 differentiated	 engagement	with	 the	 IAHRS	 by	 human	
rights	 organizations	 reflects	 varied	 capacities	 in	 terms	 of	 degree	 of	
professionalization,	 their	 levels	 of	 legal	 and	 technical	 expertise,	 and	 their	
access	 to	 international	 resources	 and	 human	 rights	 networks	 (Engstrom	 and	
Low,	forthcoming).	The	organisations	that	score	high	on	these	dimensions	are	
able	to	integrate	the	IAHRS	into	their	advocacy	work	–	such	as	Argentina’s	CELS	
and	 Colombia’s	 CCJAR	 (Colectivo	 de	 Abogados	 José	 Alvear	 Restrepo).	 The	
organisations	 that	 do	not,	 have	difficulties	 in	 taking	 advantage	of	 the	 IAHRS.	
Engaging	 in	 the	 process	 of	 litigation	 before	 the	 IAHRS	 involves	 very	 lengthy	
proceedings	 that	 imply	 a	 significant	 drain	 on	 already	 limited	 resources	 for	
NGOs	 that	pursue	 litigation.	 The	outcomes	are	 also	highly	unpredictable	 and	
very	 often	 partial.	 Still,	 the	 Commission	 receives	 an	 increasing	 number	 of	
petitions,	which	has	led	to	a	significantly	 increased	case-load,	and	back-log	of	
cases,	for	the	System.5		
Another	 aspect	 to	 highlight	 with	 regards	 to	 the	 use	 of	 the	 Inter-
American	 System	by	human	 rights	 defenders	 concerns	 the	 considerable	 risks	
often	associated	with	human	rights	work	in	Latin	America.	From	efforts	to	hold	
perpetrators	to	account	for	gender	violence	in	Mexico	to	mobilisation	around	
LGBT	or	land	rights	in	Brazil,	HRDs	face	regular	and	widespread	low-level	police	
harassment,	 political	 vilification,	 paramilitary	 violence,	 and	 threats	 of	
assassination.	 In	 the	 face	of	 these	 realities,	 a	 slow-moving	 judicial	 process	 in	
Washington	D.C.	and	San	José,	Costa	Rica	is	of	little	direct	help.	The	IAHRS	has	
attempted	 to	 respond	 to	 these	 realities	 by	 developing	 specific	 institutional																																																									
5	It	should	be	noted	in	this	regard	that	individuals	and	groups	do	not	have	direct	access	
to	 the	 Court.	 The	 Commission	 only	 has	 the	mandate	 to	 bring	 cases	 to	 the	 Court.	 In	
practice,	 this	 means	 that	 the	 lawyers	 of	 the	 Inter-American	 Commission	 have	 been	
delegated	the	responsibility	to	act	on	behalf	of	individual	petitioners.	This	also	means	
that	often	professional	human	rights	NGOs	bring	cases	representing	individual	victims	
or	group	of	victims.	The	structure	of	these	dynamics	is	such	that	potential	problems	of	
representation	and	legitimacy	may	arise,	with	NGOs	pursuing	interests	and	objectives	
that	 are	 not	 necessarily	 aligned	with	 the	 interests	 of	 individual	 victims.	While	 HROs	
often	 pursue	 actions	 and	 reforms	 that	 aim	 to	 bring	 about	 structural	 human	 rights	
reforms,	 e.g.	 devising	 litigation	 strategies	 that	 may	 that	 seek	 to	 leverage	 individual	
cases	 to	 bring	 about	 broader	 policy	 and	 legislative	 changes,	 victims	 may	 prioritise	
obtaining	remedy	for	their	own	suffering.	These	divergent	aims	could	adversely	affect	
victims’	 confidence	 in	 the	ability	of	HROs,	 and	 the	 IAHRS	more	generally,	 to	 address	
their	 areas	 of	 greatest	 concern.	 This,	 indeed,	 is	 always	 a	 potential	 issue	 in	 strategic	
litigation	cases.	
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mechanisms	 aimed	 at	 HRDs	 such	 as	 the	 use	 of	 precautionary	 measures	
(medidas	cautelares)	to	respond	quickly	to	situations	of	acute	risks.	
Nonetheless,	 the	 IAHRS	constitutes	a	privileged	transnational	political	
space	for	civil	society	activism	(on	transnationalism	and	the	IAHRS,	see	Torelly	
2015).	The	 IAHRS	provides	opportunities	 for	coalitions	and	alliances	between	
on	 the	 one	 hand	 international	 and	 regional	 organizations	with	 knowledge	 of	
the	system	and	local	organizations	with	detailed	knowledge	of	 local	 issues	on	
the	other.	Yet,	civil	society	activism	by	 itself	 is	not	sufficient	to	prompt	social	
and	 political	 change.	 In	 Latin	 America’s	 imperfect	 yet	 really-existing	
democracies,	 human	 rights	 activists	 are	 often	 compelled	 to	 engage	 with	
domestic	judicial	authorities	and	state	institutions.	As	Dulitzky	argues,		
	
	
Inter-American	system	has	been	more	effective	where	there	has	
been	 greater	 demand,	 and	 more	 spaces,	 for	 dialogue	 between	
the	government	and	 civil	 society	 and	between	 government,	 civil	
society,	 and	 the	 Inter-American	 system.	 It	 is	 also	 in	 those	 same	
countries	 where	 the	 greatest	 progress	 has	 been	made	 in	 truth,	
justice,	and	reparations	(Dulitzky	2007:145).	
	
	
Domestic	Judiciaries	
	
Beyond	civil	society	activism,	it	 is	also	important	to	see	domestic	judiciaries	as	
political	 actors.	 The	 impact	 of	 the	 human	 rights	 standards	 developed	 by	 the	
IAHRS	 depends	 on	 the	 extent	 to	 which	 domestic	 legal	 systems	 incorporate	
these	 standards.	 In	 many	 Latin	 American	 states	 human	 rights	 have	 been	
‘constitutionalized’,	and	a	wide	range	of	human	rights	treaties	and	conventions	
have	 become	 embedded	 in	 domestic	 legal	 systems.	 There	 is,	 moreover,	 a	
distinguished	 Latin	 American	 constitutional	 tradition	 that	 incorporates	
extensive	 human	 rights	 protections.	 The	 constitutional	 incorporation	 of	
international	human	rights	treaties	has	made	domestic	courts	key	actors	with	a	
potential	to	activate	human	rights	treaties	and	interpret	international	norms	in	
light	of	domestic	conditions	(Torelly	2016).	
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The	 IAHRS,	 like	 any	 other	 international	 human	 rights	 mechanism,	
requires	 petitioners	 to	 have	 reasonably	 exhausted	 remedies	 available	 in	 the	
domestic	 legal	system.6	Traditionally,	 this	allocation	of	 responsibilities	 for	 the	
protection	of	human	rights	–	as	enshrined	in	the	principle	of	complementarity	
in	 international	 human	 rights	 law	 more	 generally	 –	 limits	 the	 scope	 of	 the	
IAHRS’	 judicial	 intervention	 to	 those	 cases	 where	 domestic	 laws	 and/or	
domestic	 judicial	 mechanisms	 have	 not	 adequately	 protected	 the	 rights	 and	
principles	as	embodied	in	the	international	human	rights	instruments	adopted	
by	 the	 state	 (Abregú	 2004:4).	 The	 principle	 of	 complementarity	 also	 means	
that	the	IAHRS	has	to	decide	at	what	point	due	process	rights	as	enshrined	in	
the	 American	 Convention	 have	 been	 breached	 and	 at	 what	 point	 domestic	
courts	have	acted	arbitrarily.	The	IAHRS	has	extensively	examined	the	scope	of	
its	 judicial	 review	 powers	 in	 order	 to	 establish	 the	 boundaries	 within	 which	
decisions	taken	by	domestic	courts	cannot	be	revised	by	international	 judicial	
instances.7	 The	 IAHRS	 itself	 has	 interpreted	 its	 mandate	 not	 to	 be	 a	 ‘fourth	
instance’	 and	 as	 such	 cannot	 review	 the	 interpretations	 of	 facts	 made	 by	
domestic	 courts.	 The	 IACHR	 has	 established	 that	 “the	 basic	 premise	 [of	 the	
‘fourth	instance	formula’]	is	that	the	Commission	cannot	revise	the	sentences	
issued	by	domestic	courts	that	act	within	the	sphere	of	their	competences	and	
that	 apply	 due	 process	 guarantees,	 unless	 it	 considers	 the	 possibility	 that	 a	
violation	of	the	Convention	has	been	committed.”8	Hence,	although	the	Inter-
American	system	establishes	the	parameters	within	which	domestic	 laws	and	
judicial	 procedures	 may	 operate	 in	 order	 to	 guarantee	 the	 protection	 of	
human	 rights,	 it	 is	 in	 the	 context	 of	 the	 domestic	 legal	 system	where	 rights	
need	to	be	guaranteed.	
There	 is	 nonetheless	 significant	 regional	 variation	 not	 just	 in	 the	
effective	enforcement	of	human	rights	within	domestic	legal	systems	but	also	
in	 the	 willingness	 of	 judges	 to	 engage	 in	 the	 transnational	 legal	 culture	 of																																																									
6	 American	 Convention	 Article	 31.	 In	 practice,	 given	 the	 problematic	 nature	 of	
domestic	 judicial	 remedies	 in	 many	 Latin	 American	 countries	 in	 particular,	 the	
exhaustion	rule	is	interpreted	quite	flexibly	by	the	IACHR	and	the	Court.	See,	Cancado	
Trindade	2000.	See	also	IACtHR	Advisory	Opinion	no.11,	10	August	1990.	
7	 IACHR,	 Report	 39/96	 in	Marzioni	 (Argentina),	 14	 March	 1997.	 See	 also,	 Albanese	
1997.	
8	IACHR,	Report	39/96	in	Marzioni	(Argentina),	14	March	1997.	para.51.	
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human	rights	and	to	take	advantage	of	the	potential	 legal	and	argumentative	
resources	 available.	 Understanding	 the	 sources	 of	 this	 variation	 in	 judicial	
thinking	 and	 practice	 is	 tricky.	 Some	 key	 factors	 include	 different	 degrees	 of	
judicial	 independence,	but	also	divergent	national	 legal	traditions,	patterns	of	
legal	education,	and	engagement	with	transnational	legal	communities.	There	
have	been	gradual	 yet	 significant	 changes	 in	 judicial	 thinking	with	 regards	 to	
international	human	rights	law	and	the	jurisprudence	of	the	IAHRS	in	particular	
(González-Ocantos	 2016).	 But,	 we	 also	 need	 to	 keep	 in	mind	 the	 fragility	 of	
such	shifts	 in	 judicial	attitudes.	Beyond	 individual	cases	of	committed	 judges,	
Latin	 American	 judiciaries,	 and	 elsewhere,	 are	 attuned	 to	 and	 generally	
accommodate	 political	 shifts.	 That	 is,	 influences	 external	 to	 the	 judiciary	 –	
including	 from	 the	 governments	 and	 HROs	 –	 are	 clearly	 important	 when	
accounting	 for	 any	 judicial	 changes.	 The	 key	 point	 to	 make	 here	 is	 that	
domestic	 judges	 are	 important	 political	 actors	 that	 shape	 the	ways	 in	which	
international	human	rights	are	applied	domestically.	
Human	rights	 litigation	before	domestic	courts	has	 therefore	become	
an	important	mechanism	for	human	rights	activists	in	their	efforts	of	activating	
the	 IAHRS	 at	 the	 domestic	 level.	 The	 formal	 embedment	 of	 IAHRS	 norms	 in	
domestic	law	provides	crucial	opportunities	for	individuals	and	groups	to	claim,	
define,	 and	 struggle	 over	 human	 rights.	 The	 availability	 of	 litigation	 before	
domestic	courts	drawing	from	international	human	rights	norms	incorporated	
in	 domestic	 law	 is	 a	 key	 legitimating	 factor	 for	 civil	 society	 actors	 in	 their	
efforts	 of	 political	 and	 legal	 mobilization.	 Domestic	 courts	 therefore	 have	
become	key	arenas	for	human	rights	politics	as	litigants	are	seeking	to	pressure	
state	and	judicial	authorities	to	give	effects	to	their	international	human	rights	
commitments	 and	 to	 reform	 domestic	 human	 rights	 legislation.	 The	
internalization	of	 IAHRS	norms	 in	 domestic	 political	 and	 legal	 systems	 across	
the	 region	has,	 therefore,	partially	 shifted	how	the	System	works	 in	practice.	
Traditionally,	the	System	has	relied	on	various	forms	of	political	pressure	from	
the	IACHR,	the	OAS	(not	common),	or	(highly	 infrequently)	other	countries	to	
ensure	 compliance	with	 its	 decisions	 and	 judgements.	 At	 the	 domestic	 level,	
the	 targets	 of	 compliance	 pressures	 would	 mainly	 be	 the	 executive	 or	 the	
legislative.	That	is,	processes	of	compliance	with	the	IAHRS	were	dominated	by	
		
	
Rev.	Direito	e	Práx.,	Rio	de	Janeiro,	Vol.	08,	N.	2,	2017,	p.1250-1285.	
Par	Engstrom		
DOI:	10.12957/dep.2017.28027|	ISSN:	2179-8966		
1266	
the	 political	 branches	 of	 government	 Abregú	 2004:27).	 However,	 the	
increasing	constitutionalization	of	human	rights	has	established	domestic	court	
systems,	 as	 the	 links	 between	 constitutional	 principles	 and	 human	 rights	 in	
practice,	 in	 the	process	 locating	domestic	 courts	 as	 key	arenas	and	domestic	
judiciaries	as	key	actors	of	human	rights	politics.	
Moreover,	the	IAHRS	has	been	an	active	participant	in	these	efforts	at	
activating	 domestic	 judiciaries	 as	 enforcers	 of	 the	 Inter-American	 System’s	
norms	and	standards.	In	particular,	domestic	judiciaries	are	increasingly	in	the	
spotlight	following	far-reaching	doctrinal	developments	by	the	Inter-American	
Court.	A	unique	aspect	of	the	Inter-American	Court’s	relationship	to	domestic	
judiciaries	 is	 the	doctrine	of	 conventionality	 control,	which	says	 that	all	 state	
actors	must	 review	 laws	under	 the	American	Convention,	and	not	apply	 laws	
found	 to	 be	 in	 violation	 of	 it	 (see:	 Torelly,	 2017).	 Through	 this	 doctrine,	 the	
Court	 seeks	 to	 enlist	 all	 state	 actors	 in	 monitoring	 compliance	 with	 the	
Convention,	as	interpreted	by	the	Court.	Hence,	the	Inter-American	Court	has	
sought	 to	 expand	 the	 role	 of	 domestic	 judiciaries	 in	 enforcing	 the	 American	
Convention	and	the	rulings	of	the	Court	itself.	Conventionality	control	has	the	
potential	 to	 extend	 the	 shadow	 of	 the	 Court	 far	 beyond	 its	 relatively	 small	
docket.	In	so	doing,	however,	it	also	seeks	to	harmonise	judicial	interpretations	
of	the	American	Convention.	This	has	led	some	legal	scholars	to	argue	that	the	
Inter-American	Court	has	been	transformed	into	a	‘supranational	human	rights	
constitutional	court’,	whose	role	it	is	to	standardise	the	interpretation	of	rights	
enshrined	in	the	American	Convention	on	Human	Rights.	
Yet,	 the	 legitimate	 and	 effective	 scope	 of	 the	 IAHRS’	 impact	 on	
domestic	legal	and	judicial	processes	has	been	questioned.	In	the	first	instance,	
some	 note	 the	 crucial	 limitations	 on	 how	 conventionality	 control	 works	 in	
practice,	especially	given	the	constraints	of	the	institutional	limits	of	the	Court,	
the	capacity	of	and	resources	available	 to	domestic	 judiciaries,	as	well	as	 the	
politics	of	distinct	state	actors	on	the	ground.	There	are	also	issues	related	to	
the	practice	and	legal	doctrine	of	subsidiarity,	as	well	as	questions	concerning	
the	 degree	 of	 domestic	 autonomy	 in	 the	 implementation	 of	 international	
human	 rights	obligations.	 For	 some	 legal	 scholars	 the	conventionality	 control	
doctrine	 raises	 questions	 of	 democratic	 legitimacy.	 Contesse,	 for	 example,	
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criticises	what	he	refers	to	as	the	Inter-American	Court’s	‘Velasquez-Rodriguez	
ethos’	rooted	 in	the	early	days	of	the	Court	confronting	widespread	 impunity	
and	 unresponsive	 domestic	 institutions	 (Contesse	 2016).	 This	 is	 reflected	 in	
Cançado	 Trindade’s	 rejection	 of	 the	 adoption	 of	 a	 ‘margin	 of	 appreciation’	
doctrine	 for	 the	 Inter-American	 Court	 as	 inappropriate	 in	 the	 socio-political	
context	 of	 Latin	 America.	 Cançado	 Trindade	 asked	 (quoted	 in	 Contesse	
2016:134):	
	
How	could	we	apply	[the	margin	of	appreciation	doctrine]	 in	the	
context	of	a	regional	human	rights	system	where	many	countries’	
judges	 are	 subject	 to	 intimidation	 and	 pressure?	 How	 could	we	
apply	 it	 in	 a	 region	 where	 the	 judicial	 function	 does	 not	
distinguish	between	military	jurisdiction	and	ordinary	jurisdiction?	
How	 could	 we	 apply	 it	 in	 the	 context	 of	 national	 legal	 systems	
that	are	heavily	questioned	for	the	failure	to	combat	impunity?	…	
We	 have	 no	 alternative	 but	 to	 strengthen	 the	 international	
mechanisms	 for	protection	…	Fortunately,	 such	doctrine	has	not	
been	developed	within	the	inter-American	human	rights	system.	
	
	
Contesse,	 in	 contrast,	 maintains	 that	 regional	 changes	 towards	
democracy	 requires	 increased	 deference	 to	 national	 political	 and	 judicial	
decisions	 concerning	 the	 most	 appropriate	 and	 effective	 ways	 to	 protect	
human	 rights	 domestically.	 He	 argues	 that	 after	 the	 Court’s	 development	 of	
decades	 of	 case	 law	 and	 “significant	 political	 and	 legal	 developments	 in	 the	
region,	 one	 might	 expect	 a	 more	 nuanced	 approach	 to	 the	 relationship	
between	the	Court	and	states	parties”	(Contesse	2016:134).	
Regardless	of	one’s	understanding	of	the	 legitimacy	and	effectiveness	
of	 the	 Inter-American	 Court’s	 doctrinal	 approach	 to	 its	 relationship	 with	
domestic	 judiciaries,	 regional	 jurisprudential	 interaction	 and	 legal	 dialogues	
have	 intensified	 in	 recent	 years.	 This	 is	 evidenced,	 for	 example,	 in	 citation	
rates	 of	 the	 Inter-American	 Court’s	 jurisprudence	 by	 domestic	 judges	 (DPLF	
2010;	DPLF	2013;	Medellín	Urquiaga	2015).	As	Cassel	argues,	one	key	aspect	of	
the	 importance	of	 the	 Inter-American	Court	 lies	 in	 its	 “interpretations	of	 the	
human	 rights	 guarantees	 of	 the	 American	 Convention	 on	 Human	 Rights,	 as	
inspirations	 for	 the	 jurisprudence	 of	 national	 courts”	 (Cassel	 2007:151).	 This	
highlights,	as	well,	the	‘erga	omnes’	effects	of	the	Court.	Huneeus	captures	this	
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aspect	of	 the	 impact	of	 the	 Inter-American	Court	 very	well	 in	her	 analysis	of	
the	Court	and	advances	in	indigenous	rights	in	Colombia:	
	
The	 Inter-American	 Court	 has	 never	 issued	 a	 judgment	 against	
Colombia	 on	 indigenous	 rights.	 It	 has	 in	 recent	 years,	 however,	
developed	a	rich	jurisprudence	in	this	area	through	cases	against	
Nicaragua,	 Suriname,	 Paraguay	 and	 Ecuador,	 and	 the	 CCC	
[Colombian	Constitutional	Court]	 has	 frequently	made	 reference	
to	 these	 cases	and	used	 them	 to	 review	national	 legislation	and	
treaties	 under	 the	 constitutional	 block.	 The	 constitutionalization	
of	 the	 [IAHRS]	 has	 also	 meant	 that	 the	 CCC	 refers	 to	 [the	
System’s]	 jurisprudence	 even	 in	 matters	 not	 traditionally	
considered	 to	 be	 human	 rights	 law,	 such	 as	 criminal	 law,	 family	
law,	and	administrative	 law.	The	Supreme	Court	and	the	Council	
of	 State,	 Colombia’	 s	 highest	 administrative	 court,	 also	 regularly	
refer	 to	 the	 Inter-American	Court’s	 jurisprudence	 in	 interpreting	
questions	of	national	law	(Huneeus,	2016:191).	
	
	
State	Institutions	
	
State	 institutions	 are	 crucial	 actors	 in	 the	 effective	 implementation	 of	 IAHRS	
rulings,	recommendations	and	human	rights	standards.	State	institutions	often	
represent,	however,	the	‘black	box’	of	political	analysis	through	which	societal	
interests	are	translated	into	policies	and	policy	outcomes.	Unpacking	the	ways	
in	 which	 states	 respond	 to	 the	 IAHRS	 highlights	 the	 importance	 of	 moving	
beyond	 the	 unitary	 state	 to	 consider	 how	 various	 state	 institutions	 interact	
with	 the	 IAHRS	 and	 shape	 the	 impact	 of	 the	 System.	 Recent	 scholarship	 has	
highlighted	how	international	human	rights	institutions	rely	on	different	state	
constituencies	 both	 to	 garner	 compliance	 with	 particular	 judgments,	 and	 to	
make	human	rights	relevant	in	domestic	politics	more	broadly.	With	regards	to	
the	 IAHRS	 specifically,	 different	 state	 institutions	 are	 now	 engaged	 with	 the	
System,	 which	 has	 led	 to	 the	 ‘disaggregation’	 of	 the	 relationship	 between	
countries	 and	 the	 IAHRS.	 This	 increasingly	 means	 that	 states	 no	 longer	
interacts	with	 the	 system	 solely	 through	 their	 respective	Ministry	 of	 Foreign	
Affairs,	but	also	through	a	number	of	different	institutional	channels	including	
the	Ministry	of	Justice,	Ministerios	Públicos,	as	well	as	sub-national	authorities.	
The	IACHR’s	friendly	settlement	procedures,	for	example,	are	frequently	used	
to	 facilitate	negotiations	between	different	 state	 institutions	 and	petitioners.	
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Also,	due	to	the	IACtHR’s	creative	remedial	regime	that	emphasizes	equitable	
relief,	the	Court	frequently	issues	orders	that	require	action	from	state	actors	
other	 than	 the	 executive.	 This	 highlights	 the	 importance	 of	 paying	 closer	
attention	 to	 the	 mechanisms	 through	 which	 human	 rights	 norms	 become	
embedded,	 or	 not,	 in	 formal	 state	 institutions	 and	 the	 informal	 politics	
surrounding	them.		
There	are	various	pathways	through	which	the	procedures	and	norms	
of	 the	 Inter-American	human	 rights	 system	have	become	embedded	 in	 state	
institutions.	 For	 example,	 the	 increasing	 interaction	 with	 the	 IAHRS	 may	
strengthen	 the	 relative	 power	 of	 sections	 of	 the	 bureaucracy	 dealing	 with	
human	 rights.	 The	 adoption	 of	 a	 human	 rights	 discourse	 within	 the	 state	
bureaucracy	 empowers	 those	 actors	 and	 agencies	 with	 the	 required	 policy	
expertise	 over	 others	 in	 national	 policy-making.	 In	 cases	 of	 policy	 disputes,	
claims	 based	 on	 salient	 human	 rights	 norms	 shift	 and	 raise	 the	 burden	 of	
justification	 necessary	 to	 overcome	 the	 claimant’s	 position	 in	 favour	 of	
competing	policy	options.	Also,	 the	 institutional	 status	of	 those	state	officials	
who	 are	 engaged	 with	 the	 IAHRS	 and	 who	 are	 active	 participants	 in	
transnational	 and	 regional	 dialogues	 on	 matters	 of	 human	 rights	 is	
strengthened.	The	recognized	policy	expertise	and	international	linkages	of	the	
specialized	state	bureaucracy	may	help	to	overcome	resistance	by	other	state	
actors.	 Embattled	 ‘pro-rights’	 constituencies	 in	 some	 contexts	 have	 utilised	
rulings,	statements	and	legal	precedents	set	by	the	IAHRS	to	lend	international	
weight	to	their	efforts	to	bring	about	domestic	policy	change.	Yet,	this	is	not	to	
exaggerate	the	relative	influence	and	institutional	weight	of	the	human	rights	
bureaucracy,	as	the	numerous	challenges	of	state	administration	in	relation	to	
human	rights	implementation	discussed	below	amply	illustrate.	
Moreover,	 the	 interaction	between	 the	 IAHRS	and	 sectors	of	 the	 state	
bureaucracy	may	also	give	rise	to	processes	of	socialization	on	the	part	of	state	
officials	involved.	Whatever	their	original	views,	engaging	with	the	IAHRS,	having	
to	justify	policy	within	the	terms	of	the	dominant	discourse	of	the	system	fosters	
such	 socialization.9	 For	 example,	 the	 dynamics	 of	 the	 IACHR’s	 friendly																																																									
9	 See	 generally,	 Finnemore	 (1993)	 emphasises	 international	 organizations	 as	 the	
normative	teachers	of	state	elites,	and	Pevehouse’s	(2009)	theory	of	democratization	
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settlement	procedures	allow	specific	cases	to	generate	opportunities	to	pursue	
a	dialogue	between	petitioners,	NGOs	and	the	state	both	with	regards	to	the	
case	 itself	 and	 the	 possibilities	 of	 broader	 institutional	 reforms.	 Although	
friendly	settlement	procedures	do	not	 imply	a	 level	playing	field	between	the	
petitioners	 and	 the	 state,	 there	 are	 significant	 public	 repercussions	 when	
engaging	in	negotiations	that	may	put	pressure	on	the	government	to	reach	a	
solution.	Having	 to	engage	with	petitioners	 and	domestic	human	 rights	 groups	
may	reinforce	processes	of	socialization	of	state	officials.	
In	 addition,	 implementing	 IAHRS	 decisions	 and	 recommendations	
often	also	requires	measures	from	the	state	beyond	reparations	to	victims	of	
human	rights	violations	 in	specific	cases.	 In	this	way,	specific	 IAHRS	cases	can	
push	 specific	 human	 rights	 issues	 onto	 policy	 and	 legislative	 agendas	 and	
produce	government	policy	changes	and	institutional	 initiatives	with	the	view	
to	 prevent	 similar	 violations	 from	 occurring	 in	 the	 future.	 In	 its	 interactions	
with	 states	 the	 IAHRS	 is	 increasingly	 looking	 more	 closely	 at	 the	 state’s	
institutional	 response	 to	 any	 violations	 that	 have	 been	 committed	 than	 at	 a	
single	 rights	 violation	 by	 a	 state	 agent.	 The	 impact	 of	 the	 IAHRS	 on	 public	
policy	 formulation	 and	 implementation	 is	 to	 a	 large	 extent	 a	 function	 of	 its	
embedment,	or	institutionalisation,	in	state	institutions,	and	whether	the	state	
has	 effectively	 organized	 its	 institutions	 in	 ways	 that	 provide	 effective	
remedies	 for	 human	 rights	 violations.	 As	 a	 result,	 IAHRS	 norms	 have	 wide-
ranging	 implications	 for	 the	organization	of	 administrative	 structures	 as	 they	
increasingly	advance	standards	for	how	state	institutions	should	be	organized	
in	 order	 to	 guarantee	 human	 rights	 and	 appropriate	 remedies	 to	 victims	 of	
human	rights	violations.	
Despite	 these	 notable	 changes	 in	 the	 institutional	 relationships	
between	 many	 Latin	 American	 states	 and	 the	 IAHRS,	 significant	 challenges	
facing	 substantive	 human	 rights	 reforms	 remain.	 Clearly,	 the	 System	 is	
dependent	on	the	cooperation	of	state	institutions	for	it	to	have	an	impact	on	
human	 rights	 outcomes.	 But,	 general	 political	will	 to	 accept	 the	 authority	 of																																																																																																																																								
from	the	outside	in	focuses	on	the	role	that	face	to	face	elite	 interactions	 in	regional	
organizations	 can	 play	 in	 sensitizing	 bureaucratic	 elites	 to	 their	 interests	 in	
democratization	and	regional	cooperation.	
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the	 IAHRS,	 albeit	 important,	 does	 not	 necessarily	 translate	 into	 effective	
implementation	 of	 the	 IAHRS’	 decisions	 and	 recommendations.	 As	 outlined	
above,	 states	 are	 not	 monolithic	 entities	 and	 there	 is	 often	 a	 degree	 of	
divergence	–	both	within	and	between	the	different	branches	of	government	–	
regarding	 the	 relative	 weight	 institutions	 ascribe	 to	 human	 rights	
considerations.	 Even	 in	 cases	 where	 political	 will	 exists	 to	 comply	 with	 the	
judgements	 and	 recommendations	 of	 the	 IAHRS,	 state	 institutions	 do	 not	
always	 have	 the	 capacity	 –	whether	managerial,	 administrative,	 technical,	 or	
human	 –	 to	 ensure	 effective	 implementation	 of	 human	 rights	 reforms.	 In	
addition,	the	relationship	between	petitioners	and	the	human	rights	bureaucracy	
is	 rarely	 smooth	 and	 collaborative.	 The	 negotiations	 of	 specific	 human	 rights	
cases	 under	 the	 auspices	 of	 the	 IACHR	 are	 often	 difficult	 and	 contentious.	
Petitioners	are,	after	all,	threatening	the	state	with	international	condemnation;	
government	 lawyers	–	as	all	 lawyers	–	do	not	 like	 to	 lose	 legal	arguments;	and	
international	scrutiny	restricts	the	autonomy	of	government	action.	
Moreover,	 few	 Latin	 American	 states	 have	 formal	 institutional	
mechanisms	in	place	to	ensure	consistent	implementation	of	IAHRS’	decisions	
and	recommendations.	 Indeed,	 in	 light	of	 the	administrative	 frailties	of	many	
Latin	 American	 states,	 one	 of	 the	 key	 challenges	 lies	 in	 establishing	
administrative	 procedures	 and	 institutional	 mechanisms	 that	 ensure	 the	
implementation	 of	 IACHR	 recommendations,	 the	 sentences	 of	 the	 Inter-
American	Court,	 and	 that	would	not	 rely	on	 the	discretionary	 support	of	 the	
executive	on	a	case	to	case	basis.	Effective	state	implementation	requires	high	
level	 of	 coordination	 among	 different	 state	 institutions,	 both	 within	 the	
executive	branch	and	with	the	legislative	and	judicial	branches.	But,	there	are	
often	 significant	 obstacles	 to	 inter-agency	 communication	 and	 coordination	
within	 state	 institutions	 that	 limit	 the	 effective	 implementation	 of	 human	
rights	 reforms.	 Given	 these	 intricacies	 and	 pervasive	 irregularities	 of	 state	
administration	the	influence	of	the	IAHRS	on	domestic	reforms	is	often	subject	
to	significant	limitations.	The	IAHRS	can	provide,	nonetheless,	a	political	space	
for	 discussion	 and	 negotiation	 between	 the	 key	 actors	 involved	 in	 human	
rights	 reforms	 (including	 different	 parts	 of	 the	 state);	 it	 provides	 an	
authoritative	 set	 of	 norms	 and	 standards	 to	 regulate	 the	 specific	 issue-area	
		
	
Rev.	Direito	e	Práx.,	Rio	de	Janeiro,	Vol.	08,	N.	2,	2017,	p.1250-1285.	
Par	Engstrom		
DOI:	10.12957/dep.2017.28027|	ISSN:	2179-8966		
1272	
subject	 to	 the	 reforms;	 and	 it	 adds	 an	 additional	 layer	 of	 political	 pressure,	
momentum	and	urgency	to	the	resolution	of	human	rights	problems.	
	
	
III.	 A	 Research	 Agenda	 on	 the	 IAHRS:	 Political	 and	 Methodological	
Considerations	
	
The	 previous	 section	 highlighted	 the	 multitude	 of	 ways	 in	 which	 the	 IAHRS	
matters	 for	 domestic	 human	 rights	 change;	 that	 include	 key	 dimensions	 of	
impact	 that	 are	 not	 captured	 in	 conventional	 compliance	 models	 of	
international	human	rights	law.	In	lieu	of	a	formal	conclusion,	I	will	now	turn	to	
the	 question	 of	 how	 scholarship	 can	 contribute	 towards	 the	 genuine	
strengthening	of	the	Inter-American	Human	Rights	System.10	
As	 is	well	known,	 the	 IAHRS	 is	 facing	a	series	of	 inter-locking	political	
challenges	that	fundamentally	affect	 its	capacity	to	advance	the	realisation	of	
human	 rights	 in	 the	 region	 (see:	 Osmo	 and	Martin-Chenut,	 section	 3.2;	 and	
Veçoso	 and	Villagran	 Sandoval;	 both	 in	 in	 this	 special	 issue).	 In	 recent	 years,	
several	 states	 have	 become	 increasingly	 strident	 in	 their	 challenges	 of	 the	
system,	 particularly	 when	 IAHRS	 decisions	 have	 run	 counter	 to	 important	
geopolitical	and	economic	policy	objectives.	Moreover,	the	rise	of	sub-regional	
organisations,	 such	 as	 UNASUR,	 has	 seen	 other	 incipient	 human	 rights	
mechanisms	expand	into	areas	that	were	previously	the	exclusive	institutional	
remit	of	the	IAHRS.	The	continued	lack	of	universal	ratification	of	the	System’s	
major	 human	 rights	 instruments,	 particularly	 by	 Anglophone	 parts	 of	 the	
region,	remains	a	source	of	criticism	for	those	seeking	to	undermine	the	IAHRS.	
Also,	as	highlighted	above,	unlike	in	earlier	periods	of	the	System’s	institutional	
development,	the	region’s	governments	are	today	nearly	universally	elected	by	
popular	 vote.	 The	 formal	 democratic	 credentials	 of	 governments	 have	made	
the	 balancing	 act	 for	 the	 IAHRS	 between	 its	 role	 as	 a	 supranational	 human	
rights	arbiter	on	the	one	hand,	and	the	principle	and	practice	of	subsidiarity	on	
																																																								
10	 For	 an	 extended	 account	 of	 many	 of	 the	 issues	 discussed	 in	 this	 section,	 see	
Engstrom	et	al.	2016.
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the	 other,	 increasingly	 delicate.11	 In	 addition,	 transnational	 and	 domestic	
challenges	 to	 IAHRS	 jurisprudence	 risk	 damaging	 the	 System’s	 authority	 and	
legitimacy	in	the	eyes	of	its	key	stakeholders.	At	the	transnational	level,	cross-
national	 resistance	movements	 target	 the	 System’s	 developing	 jurisprudence	
and	practice	on	particular	human	rights	standards,	such	as	women’s	or	LGBTI	
rights,	while	 challenges	at	 the	domestic	 level	 take	many	 forms,	 including	 the	
overturning	of	IAHRS-inspired	legislation.	
It	 should	 be	 recognised,	 however,	 that	 throughout	 its	 history,	 the	
IAHRS	has	regularly	been	subject	to	fierce	criticisms,	and	it	has	operated	in	an	
often	politically	hostile	regional	context.	For	example,	one	of	the	reasons	why	
the	Commission	struggled	in	its	early	days	was	the	perception	that	it	had	been	
created	 by	 the	 United	 States	 as	 part	 of	 its	 efforts	 to	 undermine	 the	 Cuban	
revolution.	 The	 System	 has	 also	 regularly	 faced	 challenges	 from	 states	 and	
officials	hostile	to	its	expansion	and/or	to	certain	rulings.	One	crisis	in	the	late	
1990s	arose	as	a	result	of	attempts	by	the	government	of	Alberto	Fujimori	 in	
Peru	 to	 withdraw	 from	 the	 Court’s	 jurisdiction.	 Over	 the	 past	 few	 decades,	
Brazil,	 Dominican	 Republic,	 Ecuador,	 Nicaragua,	 Peru,	 Trinidad	 and	 Tobago,	
and	Venezuela	 have	 all	 variously	 suspended	payment	of	 organisational	 dues,	
(temporarily)	 withdrawn	 their	 ambassadors,	 claimed	 not	 to	 be	 bound	 by	 a	
particular	 Court	 judgment,	 and	 threatened	 to	 or	 actually	 denounced	 the	
American	Convention	following	contested	decisions.	
A	sanguine	perspective	on	the	IAHRS,	therefore,	would	seek	to	put	the	
System’s	 contemporary	 challenges	 in	 context.	 While	 the	 threat	 of	 backlash	
from	 states	 is	 real,	 it	 is	 important	 to	 differentiate	 between	 backlash	 and	
routine	domestic	judicial	and	political	processes.	Resistance	may,	in	part,	be	an	
inevitable	 consequence	 of	 being	 an	 international	 human	 rights	 institution	
fulfilling	 its	 institutional	 mandate	 of	 monitoring	 and	 scrutinizing	 the	 human	
rights	records	of	states.	Put	differently,	as	the	impact	of	the	IAHRS	grows,	so,	
too,	 do	 the	 challenges	 to	 its	 authority.	 Backlash	 against	 the	 IAHRS,	 and	
international	 human	 rights	 more	 generally,	 also	 reminds	 us	 that	 any																																																									
11	 Such	 challenges	 have	 been	 evident	 in,	 for	 example,	 the	 Court’s	 deliberations	 in	
relation	 to	 the	 applicability	 (or	 otherwise)	 of	 domestic	 reparation	 programmes,	 the	
rule	 of	 exhaustion	 of	 domestic	 remedies,	 and	 decisions	 handed	 down	 by	 domestic	
courts	regarding	reparations.	
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progressive	human	 rights	 change	 is	never	 irreversible.	 States	 can	move	away	
from	implementing	human	rights	standards	 just	as	they	can	move	towards	 it.	
In	 other	 words,	 while	 the	 political	 challenges	 to	 the	 IAHRS	 have	 their	
immediate	causes	 in	 the	shifting	 regional	politics	of	Latin	America,	 resistance	
to	impactful	human	rights	politics	should	not	come	as	a	surprise.	Longer-term	
perspectives	 on	 the	 IAHRS	 therefore	 help	 us	 to	 understand	 contemporary	
forms	of	resistance	to	the	IAHRS.	
Moreover,	 the	 IAHRS	 itself	 has	 important	 agency	 in	 confronting	
political	 challenges.	 The	 IAHRS	 has	 undertaken	 important	 institutional	
innovations	 and	 adaptations	 in	 response	 to	 persistent	 changing	 political	
circumstances.	 For	 example,	 some	 of	 the	 procedural	 reforms	 the	 IAHRS	 has	
undergone	have	had	positive	impact.	Changes	to	the	reporting	on	compliance	
monitoring	 from	 written	 reports	 only	 to	 private	 hearings	 are	 credited	 with	
increasing	institutional	impact.	Procedural	changes	are	unlikely	to	be	sufficient,	
however,	 as	 the	 historical	 record	 of	 the	 IAHRS	 indicates.	 New	 initiatives	 in	
recent	 years,	 such	 as	 creating	 a	working	 group	 of	 experts	 to	 investigate	 the	
disappearances	of	students	in	Ayotzinapa,	Mexico,	have	enabled	impact	in	real	
time,	rather	than	only	as	a	result	of	years	of	extended	legal	proceedings.	Such	
institutional	innovations	could	inspire	future	activities.	
With	 these,	 and	 other,	 challenges	 in	 mind,	 I	 will	 conclude	 by	
highlighting	 some	 of	 the	 many	 areas	 of	 concern	 that	 future	 research	 and	
advocacy	on	the	IAHRS	could	fruitfully	address.	First,	there	 is	a	pressing	need	
to	 think	 more	 seriously	 about	 backlash	 and	 resistance	 to	 human	 rights,	
including	the	IAHRS.	As	a	concrete	illustration	of	such	resistance,	there	are	the	
perennial	 concerns	 over	 the	 politicised	 nature	 of	 IAHRS	 appointments	
processes	 and	 states	 using	 appointments	 as	 a	way	 to	 shape	 the	Commission	
and	 Court	 into	 more	 deferential	 organs.	 These	 efforts	 to	 constrain	 the	
influence	 of	 the	 System	 and	 to	 exert	 more	 subtle	 political	 control	 of	 its	
institutional	development	can	be	seen	in	attempts	to	secure	appointments	of	
officials	 who	 favour	 a	 minimalist	 system	 to	 both	 the	 Commission	 and	 the	
Court.	 At	 the	 same	 time,	 civil	 society	 groups	 are	 pushing	 to	 create	 more	
avenues	for	weighing	in	on	appointments	debates.	There	is	clearly	a	need	for	
clarity	and	transparency	in	the	criteria	and	procedures	for	the	appointments	of	
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officials.	Important	advances,	external	to	the	IAHRS,	have	recently	taken	place	
in	 this	 regard,	 as	 manifested,	 for	 example,	 in	 the	 work	 of	 the	 Independent	
Panel	 for	 the	 Election	 of	 Inter-American	 Commissioners	 and	 Judges.	 Here,	
further	research	is	needed	on	the	design	and	implementation	of	appointment	
procedures	 (see	 the	 article	 of	 Salazar	 e	 Arriaza,	 in	 this	 issue).	 There	 is	
important	 comparative	 scholarship,	 for	 example,	 on	 international	 tribunals	
that	looks	into	the	process	and	politics	of	appointments	procedures.	There	has	
been	 less	 research,	 however,	 on	 the	 impact	 that	 particular	 judges	 and	
commissioners	 have	 on	 their	 institutions,	 and	 how	 this	 shapes,	 in	 turn,	 the	
impact	of	the	Inter-American	System.	
A	 second,	 and	 related,	 challenge	 facing	 the	 IAHRS	 concerns	 its	
consistent	 underfunding,	 which	 continues	 to	 limit	 the	 scope	 for	 conducting	
proactive	rights	work	and	investigations.	The	limited	resources	available	to	the	
IAHRS	 and,	 in	 particular,	 the	 Commission,	 have	 contributed	 to	 a	 significant	
backlog	 of	 petitions.	 Despite	 some	 restructuring	 of	 the	 Commission’s	 case-
management	system	in	recent	years,	such	difficulties	are	likely	to	persist	given	
the	 increasing	caseload	of	both	 the	Commission	and	 the	Court.	Although	 the	
most	alarming	projections	concerning	the	future	of	the	Commission	have	been	
dispelled	 following	 the	 acute	 financial	 crisis	 of	 2016,	 limited	 resources	
continue	 to	 be	 an	 existential	 challenge	 (Engstrom	 et	 al	 2016).	 Assuming	
stagnant	 or,	 at	 best,	 modestly	 rising	 funding	 in	 the	 coming	 years,	 the	
development	of	new	models	of	work	will	 inevitably	mean	that	personnel	and	
funds	 will	 be	 diverted	 away	 from	 existing	 areas	 of	 activity.	 Previous	
institutional	changes	–	 for	example,	expanding	the	work	of	 the	Commission’s	
Rapporteurs	 –	 resulted	 in	 greater	 pressure	 being	 put	 on	 resources	 for	
processing	 petitions.	 Additionally,	 decisions	 to	 prioritise	 particular	 areas	 or	
activities	 are	 often	 not	 subject	 to	 the	 System’s	 autonomous	 discretion.	
Institutional	 initiatives	 are	 often	 dependent	 on	 external	 donors,	 whose	
priorities	may	not	necessarily	align	with	those	of	the	IAHRS.	This	is	manifested,	
for	example,	in	the	current	difficulties	of	the	Commission	to	secure	funding	for	
its	newly	established	Unit	on	Economic,	Social	and	Cultural	Rights.	Systematic	
research	 on	 how	 resource	 priorities	 are	 set	 is	 crucial,	 therefore,	 in	 order	 to	
understand	the	decisions	that	shape	whether	the	institutional	resources	at	the	
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System’s	 disposal	 are	 deployed	 where	 the	 need	 is	 the	 greatest	 (however	
conceived).	Further	research	is	also	needed	on	the	politics	of	financing	of	the	
IAHRS.	 For	 example,	 seeking	 to	 boost	 funding	 from	 extra-regional	 donors,	
whether	 that	 entails	 state	 donors	 or	 private	 foundations,	 may	 appear	
attractive	 in	 the	 short-term,	 although	 such	 fundraising	 efforts	may	 generate	
significant	legitimacy	and	authority	challenges	from	the	System’s	detractors.	
Third,	and	building	on	the	point	 relating	 to	 institutional	priorities	and	
resource	 allocation,	 there	 is	 a	 pressing	 need	 for	 evidence-based	 research	 on	
the	 impact	 of	 the	 System.	 The	 absence	 of	 systematised	 and	 comprehensive	
data	 on	many	 areas	 of	 the	 IAHRS’	 activities	 –	 for	 example,	 on	 the	 results	 of	
precautionary	 measures	 and	 friendly	 settlements	 –	 continues	 to	 prevent	
rigorous	analysis	of	the	System.	The	need	for	better	quality	data	on	the	IAHRS	
is	pressing	in	order	to	generate	more	detailed	understanding	of	the	impact	of	
the	 System.	 For	 example,	 as	 has	 been	 emphasised	 throughout	 this	 article,	
focusing	 exclusively	 on	 the	 IAHRS’	 general	 compliance	 record	 conceals	 the	
important	effects	that	the	System	has	on	domestic	human	rights.	Although	the	
‘compliance	 crisis’	 of	 the	 IAHRS	 is	 real,	 there	 is	 significant	 variation	 in	
compliance	 patterns	 across	mechanisms	 and	 orders.	 In	 particular,	 significant	
variation	 in	 ‘compliance	 pull’	 is	 manifested	 between	 different	 IAHRS	
mechanisms.	 For	 example,	 states	 tend	 to	 comply	 more	 readily	 with	 the	
provisions	 of	 friendly	 settlements	 than	 they	 do	with	 the	 rulings	 of	 the	 Inter-
American	Court.	Research	indicates	that	this	is	explained	by	the	fact	that	states	
have	agreed	to	undertake	remedial	action	during	a	negotiation	process,	rather	
than	 having	 it	 imposed	 upon	 them	 by	 a	 court	 ruling	 (Saltalamacchi	 et	 al	
forthcoming).	
Moreover,	 further	 research	 is	 also	 needed	 to	 better	 understand	
complex	 interactive	 effects,	 institutional	 feedback	 loops,	 and	 the	 potential	
complementarity	of	 institutional	mechanisms.	For	example,	 there	 is	evidence	
to	 suggest	 that	 the	 higher	 the	 degree	 of	 complementarity	 between	
institutional	mechanisms,	the	greater	the	effects.	The	potential	 impact	of	the	
IAHRS	 is	 greatest	 when	 the	 IAHRS	 mechanisms	 are	 used	 in	 a	 coordinated	
fashion	and	as	part	of	a	coherent	strategy.	Specific	rulings	or	awareness-raising	
activities	 can	 generate	 human	 rights	 change	 in	 and	 of	 themselves,	 but	 their	
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impact	 may	 be	 amplified	 if	 they	 occur	 within	 the	 context	 of	 a	 broad	 and	
coordinated	 strategy.	 A	 notable	 example	 of	 this	 has	 been	 in	 the	 area	 of	
women’s	 rights	 where	 the	 IAHRS	 has	 used	 all	 the	 various	 instruments	 at	 its	
disposal	 –	 such	 as	 treaty-making	 (the	 Inter-American	 Convention	 on	 the	
Prevention,	 Punishment	 and	 Eradication	 of	 Violence	 against	 Women,	
“Convention	 of	 Belém	 do	 Pará”),	 rapporteurships,	 in-country	 visits,	 the	
petitioning	process	and	court	 rulings	–	 to	achieve	highly	significant	outcomes	
(see,	 in	 this	 issue,	 the	 work	 of	 Prandini).	 Where	 used	 strategically	 and	 in	
tandem,	the	System’s	mechanisms	can	be	mutually	reinforcing	and	can	amplify	
the	 impact	 of	 one	 another.	 Impact	 tends	 to	 be	 more	 limited,	 on	 the	 other	
hand,	 where	 mechanisms	 are	 used	 in	 isolation.	 In-depth	 and	 sustained	
research	is	needed	to	better	understand	whether,	and	in	what	ways,	the	Inter-
American	System	may	have	demonstrable	positive	effects	on	domestic	human	
rights	through	such	pathways	of	impact.	
Finally,	genuine	methodological	and	disciplinary	pluralism	in	the	study	
of	the	IAHRS,	and	international	human	rights	more	generally,	is	long	over-due.	
Hafner-Burton	and	Ron	argue	that	scholarly	assessments	of	the	role	of	law	and	
institutions	 in	 protecting	 human	 rights	 tend	 to	 be	 significantly	 shaped	 by	
choice	 of	 research	method	 (Hafner-Burton	 and	 Ron	 2009).	While	 statistically	
inclined	research	generally	attribute	very	 little	 impact,	 if	any,	 to	 international	
human	rights	institutions,	qualitative	case	studies	tend	to	find	often	significant	
influence	 of	 international	 law	 and	 institutions	 on	 political	 behaviour.	
Qualitative	approaches	to	the	study	of	the	effects	of	the	IAHRS	enable	in-depth	
analyses	of	what	are	often	complex	and	prolonged	pathways	to	human	rights	
compliance;	processes	that	quantitative	studies	are	ill	equipped	to	illuminate.	
Yet,	 divergent	 assessments	 are	 grounded	 in	 often-irreconcilable	
epistemological	 positions	 with	 many	 qualitative	 scholars	 rejecting	 the	
utilitarian	 groundings	 of	 research	 into	 questions	 of	 impact	 and	 institutional	
effectiveness.	 Fortunately,	 an	 increasing	methodological	diversity	 is	enriching	
our	 understandings	 of	 both	 the	 potential	 and	 limits	 of	 human	 rights	
institutions	in	affecting	political	outcomes.	The	combination	of	methodological	
approaches	 is	 clearly	 to	be	promoted,	but	 at	 the	 same	 time	 it	 should	be	 the	
central	 questions	 and	 research	puzzles	of	 this	 particular	 field	of	 enquiry	 that	
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guide	the	appropriate	methods	and	disciplinary	approaches	and	not	the	other	
way	around.	
In	 this	 sense,	moreover,	an	 interdisciplinary	approach	 to	 the	study	of	
international	 human	 rights	 and	 its	 impact	 on	 domestic	 politics	 calls	 for	 a	
dislocation	 of	 disciplinary	 and	 theoretical	 boundaries.	 For	 example,	 much	
scholarship	 continues	 to	 adopt	 understandings	 of	 human	 rights	 that	 focus	
exclusively	on	imposing	constraints	on	state	behaviour.	Focusing	exclusively	on	
the	 law	as	a	constraint,	however,	misses	the	 important	constructive	role	that	
international	 human	 rights	 law	 has	 in	 legitimating	 political	 behaviour	 and	 in	
enabling	 state	 reforms.	 This	 has	 been	 highlighted	 above,	 for	 instance,	 in	 the	
discussion	 of	 the	 role	 of	 the	 IAHRS	 in	 potentially	 enabling,	 as	 opposed	 to	
constraining,	 state	 action	 for	 the	protection	 and	promotion	of	 human	 rights.	
Similarly,	there	has	been	an	overwhelming	focus	 in	human	rights	research	on	
evaluations	of	the	empirical	relationship	between	state	participation	in	human	
rights	treaties	and	country	performance	on	different	measures	of	human	rights	
in	 practice.	 This	 literature	 has	 generated	 important	 insights	 into	 the	 political	
dynamics	of	state	commitment	to	 international	human	rights	and,	 to	a	 lesser	
extent,	 the	effects	of	 treaty	 ratification	on	 state	behaviour.	 Yet,	 an	exclusive	
focus	on	formal	treaties	has	 important	drawbacks.	 In	the	first	 instance,	these	
global	 large-N	 comparisons	 do	 not	 capture	 what	 are	 strong	 regional	
differences	 in	 the	 relative	 effectiveness	 of	 regional	 human	 rights	 regimes	
which	countries	are	parties	to.	But	most	crucially,	as	pointed	out	above,	there	
is	clearly	no	mechanical	equivalence	between	treaty	ratification	and	domestic	
human	rights	reforms.	Rather,	formal	state	ratification	of	human	rights	treaties	
is	often	followed	by	a	protracted	and	contentious	process	of	political	struggle	
about	the	domestic	implementation	of	human	rights	norms.	This	points	to	the	
importance	 of	 grounded	 analysis	 of	 domestic	 political	 processes	 of	 the	 kind	
suggested	in	this	article.	This	seems	particularly	important	as	studies	of	human	
rights	governance	increasingly	engage	with	studies	of	what	explains	repression	
and	 human	 rights	 violations	 in	 the	 first	 place.	 	 By	 leveraging	 the	 IAHRS,	
domestic	 human	 rights	 groups	 across	 Latin	 America	 have	 been	 able	 to	 keep	
human	rights	demands	alive,	despite	state	and	judicial	resistance	and	obstacles	
encountered	 at	 home.	 Indeed,	 the	 emergence	 and	 consolidation	 of	
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movements	of	victims,	their	relatives,	and	human	rights	advocates	explain	to	a	
large	 extent	 the	 persistence	 of	 claims	 over	 time	 that	 characterises	 the	
development	of	human	rights	as	a	field	of	political	practice	in	Latin	America.	
In	 short,	 domestic	 actors	 tend	 not	 to	 remain	 passive	 recipients	 of	
international	 human	 rights	 norms	 and	 there	 are	 important	 feedback	
mechanisms	as	these	actors	influence	the	development	of	international	norms	
and	 institutions.	The	effects	on	the	 institutional	development	of	the	 IAHRS	 in	
turn	 have	been	 significant.	 The	 Inter-American	Commission	 in	 particular,	 but	
also	the	Inter-American	Court,	have	at	various	critical	conjunctures	found	allies	
in	 the	 regional	 human	 rights	 movements.	 As	 a	 result,	 the	 normative	
strengthening	 of	 human	 rights,	 as	 codified	 by	 the	 IAHRS,	 can	 from	 this	
perspective	 be	 seen	 as	 a	 series	 of	 legal	 and	 institutional	 responses	 to	 the	
concrete	 conditions	 the	 human	 rights	 advocates	 and	 movements	 faced	
following	the	formal	political	transitions	to	democracy	 in	Latin	America.	From	
this	perspective,	despite	the	many	challenges,	the	future	of	the	Inter-American	
System	looks	distinctly	bright.	
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